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Abstract
I study two-way effects between financial markets and contractual agreements with a risk
sharing component, such as compensation packages within a firm, or mortgages and loans. I
construct a model with many Units, in each of which one of the contracting individuals, the
Agent, has private information, while the uninformed individual, the Principal, has the op-
portunity to trade with the Principals in other Units. I give general conditions under which
financial markets induce a transfer of risk from Agents to Principals. I also show how asym-
metric information interacts with financial markets through two channels. First, the distortion
of the allocation of the high risk Agents, feeds back in the market portfolio increasing risk on
markets, and in the contracts of the low risk Agents. Secondly, markets change the Principals’
screening problem preventing low risk Agents from enjoying an information rent. The model
results can explain empirical evidence from the subprime mortgage market during the secu-
ritization boom leading to the 2008 financial crisis and suggest further implications for other
markets segment.
1 Introduction
Risk is transferred and pooled among individuals in different ways. For example, by trading
assets on financial markets, or by contractual arrangements among individuals. I study how
these two modes of risk sharing interact in presence of asymmetric information, and how their
interaction affects the distribution of risk and welfare.
These interactions are relevant in a modern economy. For example, most forms of bonus
compensation necessarily involve some form of risk sharing, because of the difficulty in obtaining
1
a precise performance measure, or because of profit sharing. Labor compensation is typically
the most relevant expense for a corporation. In the US, for example, more than 60% of the
payment to factors group in the 2009 GDP in US was to labor.1 Since the stock of a company
is a claim to its profits, the firm’s decisions on workers’ compensation affect the returns of
its stock. In the aggregate this affects financial markets. On the other hand, diversification
opportunities offered by markets influence the design of compensation packages.
Another interesting case of the interaction of these two modes of risk sharing is the securiti-
zation of individual contracts, like insurance policies and mortgage loans. In the past decades,
these contracts have been increasingly often packaged into traded assets. The recent financial
isa prime example that this evolution of financial markets can and will affect non-market agree-
ments, such as mortgages, and that these changes can at times feedback into financial markets
with spectacular consequences.
In both cases, it is important for the firm, the insurer or the loan issuer, to assess certain
qualities of the counterparty, in order to design the contract maximizing their profits. In some
cases these can be directly observed (freely or at some cost), in other cases these qualities
are private information, and they can be screened by offering the informed party a menu of
different contracts to choose from. I show channels through which diversification opportunities
interact with asymmetric information and how these interactions induce transfers of risk and
welfare across different types of individuals in the economy. After providing conditions under
which risk shifts to individuals accessing markets, I show two novel effects, specific to the case
of asymmetric information. First, there is a transfer of welfare from high quality individuals to
their counterparties with access to markets. This effect follows from the way in which diversi-
fication changes the tradeoffs involved in the design of optimal screening contracts. Secondly,
I show how informational distortions reverberate across the economy putting more risk in the
hands of high quality agents and of individuals accessing markets: asymmetric information
shifts risk from low quality agents to the equilibrium portfolios of trading agents, and from
there on to the contracts offered to high types.
To study the interactions between contracting and financial markets, I construct a model
with private information in which all individuals are paired into Units generating returns, which
are shared by means of a contract. In each Unit, one of the contracting individuals, the Agent,
has private information, while the uninformed individual, the Principal, has the opportunity
to trade with the Principals in the other Units. In the context of firms, Principals and Agents
can be seen as Investors and Employees; in the context of securitization, Agents are individuals
1 Economic Report of the President, 2010
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taking out a loan or an insurance contract, whereas Principals are the financial institutions
securitizing. Tris generates two-way effects from markets to Units, and vice versa.
I use this model to analyze both directions of interaction.
1. How does the existence of asset markets affect contracts within individual Units?
2. How does asymmetric information in the Units affect asset markets?
First, since financial markets allow individuals to diversify risk, one would expect that they
would make Principals act as if they were less risk averse. This changes the terms of risk sharing
and make contracts less risky for Agents, the “Insurance Effect”. Several examples show that
this intuitive property need not hold (even in the simple case of symmetric information, in
which Agents’ types are public at the contracting stage). I give sufficient conditions which
rule out these unexpected effects of markets: a large number of Units with a limited level of
correlation across them. These are fairly general assumptions, which arguably correspond to
features of real financial markets.
Second, Principals solve the screening problem they face inside Units by designing contracts
offering different levels of risk to different types of Agents. The need to screen distorts risk
sharing within Units. In particular, it leads to an inefficiently high level of risk held by Princi-
pals, which they consequently trade on asset markets. Excess market risk is hence a byproduct
of asymmetric information in agency relationships within Units.
However the lower risk aversion metaphor cannot explain the third result: the excess of
aggregate risk in the market portfolio will partially trickle down to the contracts held by low
risk agents; an effect of asymmetric information which is due to the market portfolio transferring
risk across firms.
Finally, there are welfare implications. A large market, offering enough diversification
possibilities, reduces informational distortions within Units. However, and perhaps more in-
terestingly, some of the individuals who do not access markets will bear a cost. All Agents
will see their utility pushed to the reservation level, even if they enjoyed some information
rent in absence of markets (or in presence of a smaller market). In particular, those who will
lose will be the low risk Agents, even if they do not directly access markets. Going back to
the applications discussed earlier, this last result means that more developed financial markets
can harm good workers, or safe loan applicants, if they cannot obtain access to these markets.
This is because trading opportunities naturally increase the welfare of Principals’, not only by
allowing them to adjust their portfolios, but also by improving their ability to extract welfare
from Agents.
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While these are new results, the study of financial markets as means to share risk in relation
to other types of risk sharing, and their effects on each other have already been touched upon
by the economic and financial literature.
I do not study the effects of asymmetric information in markets, but rather the effects that
asymmetric information resolved elsewhere has on markets, and vice versa. This marks the
first difference from the General Equilibrium works on insurance markets, starting from the
seminal paper of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Another important difference is that, in those
papers, the fact that some individuals are risk neutral is usually an assumption (An exception
is Dubey and Geneakoplos (2002), in which individuals endogenously pool to share risk). In
this paper there are many risk averse investors, who access financial markets to trade away
part of the risk they are exposed to. Traditionally, Principals are modeled as risk neutral
expected utility maximizers because of their access to diversification opportunities. While I
give conditions under which markets will induce a Principal to offer less risk to Agents, than
they would without markets, I also show that even in this case, risk aversion plays a role as
markets induce transfers of risk across types.
Within the more recent General Equilibrium literature, this paper fits best in spirit with
other works, with more recent papers linking markets and non-markets transactions. For
example, Legros and Newman (1996) analyze the internal organization of firms, in relation to
the distribution of wealth in the economy and the imperfections of credit markets. Legros and
Newman (2002) use markets to show how shocks to individual firms can cause restructuring in
a sector. Similarly, in this paper the internal agreements in a firm impact those in other firms,
but the channel is here that of financial markets. Gibbons, Holden, and Powell (2012) take
firms formation as exogenous, as in the present work, but their focus is the effect of information
sources on the allocation of control within the firm. Some papers in the General Equilibrium
literature focus instead on the problem of hidden action, such as the works by Magill and
Quinzii (2005), Parlour and Walden (2011), which bear similarities to this one. They also take
firm formation as an exogenous process, abstracting from labor market considerations, and
they allow for contracts inside firms and financial markets across firms. Magill and Quinzii
show how available securities affect economic incentives, whereas Parlour and Walden consider
effort in the moral hazard problem a human capital investment, and use their model to derive
testable implications (for example on size effect) on the cross section of stock returns.
The work is closer in spirit to papers on financial intermediation such as Diamond (1984),
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) or Colla (2011). However these consider the information rev-
elation process as a a function of the effort of the intermediary. I consider a specific information
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process, with novel welfare implications.
A strand of the finance literature looks at asset pricing in the presence of delegated portfolio
management (for a survey, see Stracca (2003), for a more recent example including review of
more recent literature see Ou-Yang (2011)). These studies look at the effect on prices and
returns of the classical informational asymmetry problems. In this literature a representative
principal delegates his investing decisions to an agent. Inefficiencies take the form of deviations
from the non-delegated case equilibrium which take the form of changes in asset prices and
optimal portfolio composition. Besides the different object of interest, the perspective in these
works is in a sense opposite of the one taken here. There we have informed parties trading,
whereas in the present work it is the uninformed parties who access markets.
Several findings in the empirical literature provide evidence compatible with the theoretical
results in this paper. The recent subprime crisis in the United States naturally provided
motivation for a wave of work enquiring the relation between mortgages and financial markets.
I will mention a few here, all of which show how screening attitudes, changed before the
subprime crisis, as securitization was booming. In general, these papers provide evidence of
less screening and of an expansion of the mortgage pool in the direction of riskier loans. Their
findings are consistent with the model’s prediction that when more mortgages are securitized,
then contracts of different types become closer, and that inclusion can only go in the direction
of subprime applicants. Mian and Sufi (2009) and Purnandam (2011) show how institutions
granting mortgage loans relaxed their screening practices, a change accelerated between 2005
and 2007, when securitization activity intensified. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) identify several
channels affecting screening standards, including securitization practices (even though their
goal is discussing in general the relation between credit growth and lending standards). Finally,
Keys et al. (2010) show how the specific “rule of thumb” used by institutions has been relaxed
and they relate the change to the increasing prevalence of securitization of loans. Agarwal et al.
(2012) show a similar pattern, but further break it down to loans issued by a single institution,
distinguishing between those which were sold off and those retained on the balance sheet. The
present work suggests further venues for empirical analysis. Namely, analyzing the impact of
securitization on “prime” market segments.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a description of the model including
primitives. Section 3 discusses the equilibrium concept and its existence. Section 4 presents
the main results in the simpler case of independent returns. In section 5 I present an extension
in which the pool of contracted Agents is endogenous. In Section 6 I discuss systemic risk and
give sufficient conditions for results to hold in presence of systemic risk. Section 7 concludes.
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The Appendix contains all proofs and two examples of economies which do not satisfy the
assumptions and conditions discussed in Section 5.
2 The Model
To capture the feedback between contracting and trading on financial markets, I construct
a model of an economy in which risk averse individuals can share risk through one-to-one
contracting and some of them can diversify their risk by exchanging assets on a competitive
market. Results are driven by the fact that those who access markets are in a sense solving
two problems, with the same control variables: they have to design a contract and a security.
2.1 Primitives
There are 2N individuals with identical expected utility preferences U (X) = E [u (X)], with
quadratic utility function u (x) = x− b
2
x2.2
N individuals are Principals, and N are Agents. Principals are all identical. An Agent can
be of type t ∈ {L,H}, which is his private information and influences the Agent’s performance.
Agent’s types are independently drawn from a commonly known distribution f on {L,H} such
that Pr (t (n) = L) = q and Pr (t (n) = H) = 1− q .
There are N Units, each unit n is formed by a Principal Pn and an Agent An, whose type
is t (n). Unit n generates random returns X (t (n)), whose distribution is common knowledge
and depends on the Agent’s type. Any pattern of correlation between Units’ is admissible.
Since preferences can be expressed as functions of mean or variance a single coefficient
ρm,ns,t ∈ [−1, 1] describes all payoff relevant covariation between Units m and n with agents of
type t(m) = s and t(n) = t.
Principals are entitled to the returns generated by the unit. Agents obtain a reservation
utility of u if they do not participate in production, while Principals obtain zero.
2.2 Contracting
Principals and Agents within each Unit, share surplus through linear contracts. A contract
Cn = (αn, βn) specifying the fixed amount where αn the share of output βn which the Principal
can claim.3
2 where b is small enough that utility is increasing.
3This notation is opposite to what one typically finds in a contract theory paper. However, this choice is convenient
as most of the complexity here is in the Principal’s objective function
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After a contract is signed, Principal Pn holds the random variable αn + βnX (t (n)) , and
Agent An holding −αn + (1− βn)X (t (n)).
Each Principal Pn offers to agentAn a menu of contractsMn = [CnL, C
n
H ] = [(α
n
L, β
n
L) , (α
n
H , β
n
H)].
An picks his preferred contract, or decides to not participate and obtain his reservation utility u.
Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to Incentive Compatible (menus such that
Agents of type t would pick Ct would pick over any other contract) and Individually Rational
menus (menus such that agents of type t would pick Ct rather than his outside option).
4
E [u (−αt + (1− βt)Xt)] ≥ E [u (−αs + (1− βs)Xt)] , ∀s, t ∈ {L,H}
E [u (−αt + (1− βt)Xt)] ≥ u
2.3 Market
In the final stage, each Principals is endowed with her claims to profits αnt(n) + β
n
t(n)X (t (n)),
which they will be able to trade at price qn, together with a riskless asset available in zero net
supply at price q0. A portfolio of financial assets is denoted by θ = (θ0|θ1, ..., θN ). θ0 is the
position an investor holds in the riskless asset. θ1, ..., θN are the holdings of securities arising
from contracting within each of the N Units. The solution concept used here is competitive
equilibrium. All Principals choose a portfolio θn they can afford to maximize their expected
utility, taking prices as given. Equilibrium prices will be such that all markets clear.
2.4 Timeline
The model plays out as follows
• Time 0 Nature randomly draws the types of each Agent.
– A type realization t = t (1) ...t (N) is drawn from distribution F = XNn=1f .
• Time 1 Each Principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to Agent he is matched with in
the form of an Incentive Compatible menu of contracts
– M =
[
M1, ...,MN
]
is the vector of menus offered in each of the N Units.
• Time 2 Each Agent An chooses a contract from the menu he is offered, or he can choose
to not participate and obtain his reservation utility.
4 The fact that Principals interact with each other only on the asset market, makes this a straightforward
application of the Revelation Principle.
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– c =
[
c1 (·) . . . cN (·)] the vector of Agents’ choices, we have that c (M) is the vector
of contracts chosen by agents facing menus M =
[
c1
(
M1
)
, ..., cN
(
MN
)]
.
• Time 3 Principals trade on the asset market.
– Since securities payoffs are determined by contracts C = [Cn]Nn=1 and by agents’
skills t, portfolios θn and prices q =
[
q1, . . . qN
]
will be functions (θ, q) (C, t).
Finally, uncertainty is realized and contracts and assets pay off.
When Principals design contracts at time 1, they are also designing their endowment in the
market at time 3, so that available securities are determined by risk sharing within units. This
link creates the feedback between markets and contracts in equilibrium.
3 Equilibrium
Given the sequential nature of the model, I will describe payoffs within each pair and define
the equilibrium concept by backward induction.
(and then the equilibrium concept) working backwards from the final stage.
Asset Market
Consider a Principal’s holding portfolio θ, given a type realization t, and contracts C. Her
utility will be:
U3Pn (θ,C, t) = E
[
u
(
θ0 + Σ
N
m=1θm [α
m + βmX (t (m))]
)]
Principals will choose a portfolio to maximize their expected utility given prices.
Contracting, Agents’ turn
When Agent An chooses contract Cn out he gets a payoff off
U2An (C
n, t (n)) = E [u (−αn + (1− βn)X (t (n)))]
Contracting, Principals’ turn
At time 1 the expected utility of a Principal holding portfolio θ, when menus are M, Agents
choose contracts c (M) is
8
U1Pn (c (M) , θ) = Et
[
U3Pn (θ, c (M) , t)
]
Each principal offers a menu, without knowing the Agents’ types. However, they correctly
foresee the strategies of each agent, and the outcome of asset markets. In other words, they
can forecast the equilibrium path for all possible offered menus M, realizations of types t, and
chosen contracts c (M). Principals at this stage are playing a game against each other. Their
strategies are menus, with Principal Pn offering menu Mn
Based on this timeline we can write the utility in the first stage in this form:
V n
(
Mn|M−n) = U1Pn (c (Mn|M−n, t˜) , θ (c (Mn|M−n, t˜))) (1)
3.1 Definition
An Equilibrium consists of
• Portfolios θn∗ (C, t) for each Principal Pn and prices q∗ (C, t) ∈ RN+1 such that [θ∗, q∗] (C, t)
is a competitive Equilibrium for the asset market taking place after contracting. Each
principal is endowed with one unit of her asset so that the endowment of principal n is
wn = [0, 0, ..., 1, ..., 0, 0] with 1 being in the nth position, and its value qn∗ .
θn∗ (C, t) ∈ arg max
θ∈RN+1+
U3Pn (θ,C, t)
s.t.
q∗ (C, t) · θ (C, t) ≤ qn∗ (C, t)∑
n∈N
θn∗0 = 0
∑
n∈N
θn∗m = 1, ∀m = 1, ..., N
• For each agent An an optimal choice of contract out of the menu he is offered, conditional
on hist type realization. cn∗ (M, t) such that
cn∗ (M
n, t (n)) ∈ arg max
C∈Cn
U2An (C, t (n))
• For each principal Pn, a lottery M˜n∗ of menus such that
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supp
[
M˜n∗
]
⊆ arg max
Mn∈M
V n(Mn|M−n∗ )
Before stating the existence result and sketch its proof, it is important to discuss some
features of this model. First, Principal and Agents are matched randomly. There is hence no
competition between Principals to obtain a better Agent. Second, Firms act as price takers
at the trading stage, but they act strategically when designing contracts. This is similar to
Spence (1977), and other models, in which firms choose capacity strategically but behave as
price takers in the following market stage. An alternative would be to have an oligopolistic
market at the second stage, as in Dixit (1980) and others, but this does not seem to reflect the
size of financial markets. Thirdly, the use of IARA5 utility function is dictated by the necessity
of having an expression for the asset market equilibrium simple enough to make the screening
problem tractable.6 This choice is also non standard but, as I will discuss late in section , using
these preferences actually stacks the card against the main results.
3.2 Existence
Theorem 1. There is an equilibrium as defined in Section 3.1 .
The proof, in the appendix, follows the traditional pattern of using the maximum theorem
to guarantee that individuals’ best responses are well behaved enough to apply a fixed point
theorem. However, some extra care is needed to insure the continuity necessary to apply the
maximum theorem. For Principals’ payoffs to be continuous in their own strategies (menus), it
has then to be the case that (i) the contracts chosen by Agents change continuously with the
menus offered ( cn (M, t) is continuous in MN and (ii) the Equilibrium correspondence of the
asset market stage is a continuous function of the prevailing contracts. The first is achieved by
noting that the economy has the same equilibria if we restrict Principals to offering Incentive
Compatible Menus. The second point is trickier, as the Walrasian Equilibrium correspondence
is in general neither continuous, nor single-valued.
However, the assumptions on preferences and the existence of a riskless asset assure that,
5 Increasing Absolute Risk Aversion
6 The classical CARA-Gaussian framework could not be used in this context, because the Principal’s objective
function at the contracting stage would have been a mixture of normals making the standard “Certainty Equivalent”
procedure impossible. This would have precluded a tractable solution of the screening problem (as Principals are risk
averse we cannot proceed like in Jullien e al. (2007)). On the other hand Markowitz preferences on a more general
domain would have posed problems for existence and consistency, as they are not expected utility preferences. See,
for example, Dekel (1986) or Machina (1989).
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for a given distribution of returns, the asset market equilibrium exhibits the properties of a
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) equilibrium, which are
• Portfolio Separation. Every individual in the economy holds a fraction of the same
portfolio of risky assets, the “Market Portfolio”. In this case, all traders have the same
preferences, and will hence be holding the same fraction of the Market Portfolio. Dif-
ferences in initial wealth are accounted for by a short or long position in the riskless
asset.
• “Beta” Pricing. The price of a financial asset is a linear function of its expected payoff
and the sum of its variance plus its correlation with the market portfolio, with the former
becoming negligible, when many securities are available for trade.
Because of these two properties, all final holdings are uniquely determined as a continuous
function of endowments. As endowments are determined by contracts, and final holdings
determine utilities, the maximum theorem can be applied.
4 Markets and Contracts with Diversifiable Risk
Having established existence of equilibrium in the model, we can now turn to the relationship
between financial markets and contracting.
As in the previous sections, I will here focus on the case in which both agents guarantee
the same expected returns ( µL = µH), but different variance ( σ
2
L < σ
2
H ). This assumption is
generalized in Section 9.4 to include familiar cases such as type L guaranteeing a higher mean,
or type H having a higher probability of default).
In this section I will assume Units’ returns to be uncorrelated, which implies that, with a
large number of Units in the
economy, risk can be entirely diversified away. In Section 6 I will discuss the implications
of systemic risk.
Assumption 1. ∀m,n ≤ N, X (t (n)) and X (t (m)) are independently distributed.
4.1 Insurance
When Principals can diversify some of their risk through the asset markets, they will be facing
a lower cost of taking more risk at the contracting stage. In this model, this implies Principals
retain a larger share of the Unit’s return β. Conversely, Agents end up with less risk, when
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markets are present, even though they have no direct access to diversification by means of
trading.
Let Mn (N) be the equilibrium menu in unit n, in an economy with N Units. M (1) is
hence the optimal menu of contracts for an economy with a single Unit.7
M (N) = [Mn (N)]Nn=1 = [C
n
G (N) C
n
H (N)]
N
n=1 = [(α
n
L (N) , β
n
L (N)) (α
n
H (N) , β
n
H (N))]
N
n=1
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1, and 3,
• βnL (N) < 1, βnH (N) ≤ 1
• limN→∞ βnL (N) = 1,∀n,∀t
• ∃Ns.t.βnH (N) = 1,∀N ≥ N
Lemma 1 establishes the convergence of any economy to full insurance for both types.
As a consequence we can conclude that adding enough Units, and hence securities, creates
diversification opportunities for Principals to “insure” Agents. Note that the contract for H
types reaches full insurance in a finite market, whereas the L type contracts never fully insure
the agent.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 3, increasing the number of Units in an economy,
eventually induces Principals to retain more risk at the contracting stage.
∀N,∃N : βnt
(
N ′
) ≥ βnt (N) , ∀n,∀t ∈ {L,H} , ∀N ′ ≥ N
This seemingly natural “Insurance Effect” is not a foregone conclusion. The previous the-
orem shows that Agents are always “insured” by markets in economies with a large number of
units, with independent returns.
lim
N→∞
V n
(
Mn|M˜−n
)
→ Et [Mn]
The proof of Lemma 1 shows that the problem of a Principal exhibits enough regularity8
to ensure that the straightforward convergence of the utility function leads to convergence of
the solution. it never actually reaching its limit at a finite size.
7 This is also the optimal menu in any economy when Principals do not trade.
8The proof in the appendix uses techniques, similar to those of in Maskin and Riley (1984) to show that if type
Second Order Stochastic Dominance between types reduce the set of relevant constraints.
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4.2 Risk and Welfare
The previous result highlights how markets change equilibrium contracts. Here I discuss the
implications for the allocation of welfare and risk.
To do so, it is first necessary to describe the effect of markets in the symmetric information
case. Similar conclusions to those of Theorem 2 apply to the first best contracts Cˆ =
(
αˆ, βˆ
)
.
Lemma 2.
• βˆnt (N) < 1
• limN→∞ βˆnt (N) = 1, ∀n,∀t
Theorem 3. Increasing the number of Units in an economy, eventually induces Principals to
retain more risk at the contracting stage.
∀N,∃N : βˆnt
(
N ′
) ≥ βˆnt (N) ,∀n,∀t ∈ {G,B} , ∀N ′ ≥ N
Both symmetric and asymmetric information economies converge to an identical equilib-
rium, in which both types are offered the same full insurance contract (α, 1) with α such that
u (−α) = u . However, there is an important difference. Under asymmetric information, the
contract of type H is the full insurance contract already for a finite N .
Type L values a marginal increase of his fraction of the Unit (1− β), more than type H
does, and Agents’ obtain the same utility only for full insurance contracts, consisting only of
a cash transfer ((α, 1)). For any given contract with β < 1, L obtains a strictly larger utility.
CH guarantees H a utility of u. The positive difference ∆u = E [u (−αH + (1− βH)XL)]− u
is the “information rent” of type L. CL has to guarantee type L at least u + ∆u, otherwise
it will not be chosen over CH . This contract leaves the principal worse off than the first best
contract CˆL, which would have pushed L to his reservation utility.
To avoid giving up too much utility when the Agent is of type L, the Principal distorts
CH to make it less desirable for type L, while yielding the same utility to type H. Distortion
takes the form of overinsuring type H, by giving him more cash and less of the Unit’s return.
However, distortion also reduces Principal’s utility.
The optimal contract strikes the right balance between two extremes. On one hand, a “Rent
Menu” of contracts, with minimum distortion for Agent H and maximum rent for Agent L;
On the other hand a “Distortion’ Menu” under which H is fully insured, and L is pushed to
his reservation utility. Because markets change the cost of bearing risk for the principal, they
also make “Distortion” less costly than “Rent” moving the equilibrium contract closer to the
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former, ultimately nullifying type L information rent.
As the discussion above suggests, equilibrium contracts are in general different from the
symmetric information ones, and have different welfare properties.
To distort the allocation of type H, who will be insured more than he would be at the
optimum, Principals take on more risk than they would if they did not have to take into account
incentive compatibility. Because this risk is then poured onto the market, we can conclude that
asymmetric information within units generates excess aggregate risk on the security market.
Proposition 1. In a large market, ex ante Aggregate Risk is higher than in the symmetric
information economy. 9
E
(
N∑
1=1
(
βnt(n)
)2
σ2t(n)
)
≥ E
(
N∑
1=1
(
βˆnt(n)
)2
σ2t(n)
)
To achieve this result it is also necessary to prove the following Lemma 10
Lemma 3. In a large market, asymmetric information induces H (L) agents to carry less
(more) risk.
βiH > βˆ
i
H
βiL < βˆ
i
L
The first part follows from the need to screen H types by overinsuring them. The second is
due to the fact that part of the informational distortion on the type H contracts reverberates to
the type L contracts through the market portfolio every Principal holds in equilibrium, because
Principals are risk averse.
Having established the direction of all transfers of risk, I can now assess the effects of the size
of markets on this problem. Lemma 1 (and 5 for the general case) show that the information
structure change the dynamics of convergence for the contract of type H. βH reaches 1 (full
insurance) at a finite number of units N , whereas in the first best economy none of the two
types is ever fully insured.
Using the distortion with respect to the symmetric information contracts ∆t (N) = |βt (N)−
βˆt (N) | as a measure of the effects of asymmetric information,the following result shows that
financial markets mitigate the effects of information asymmetries within Units.
9 The result follows from Theorem 4.3 (which is stated in the Appendix for the more general case).
10Corresponding to Theorem 4.1 and 4.2, also in the appendix.
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Proposition 2. Increasing the number of units in an economy, makes contracts closer to the
symmetric information ones.
∀N,∃N : ∀N ′ ≥ N,∆t
(
N ′
)
< ∆t (N)
This result relies on the convergence of contracts to full insurance for all agents.
Diversification opportunities make Principals’ behave as if they were less risk averse. As a
result they can better exploit Agents’ own risk aversion to screen them. It is hence possible
for a Principal to achieve a more advantageous outcome, by offering a menu closer to the first
best. This need not coincide with a Pareto Improvement. In fact, while Principals are naturally
made better off by the extra opportunities provided by markets, and Agents of type H see no
change in their utility level (u), and Agents’ of type L can be made worse off, as the next result
shows.
We have seen that L Agents enjoy a non negative rent ∆u. In fact there can be no rents in
a large enough market.
Corollary 1. With large enough markets, no agent enjoys an information rent.
∃N : ∀N ≥ N,U (Ct (N) , t) = u,∀t
To optimally screen types, a Principal faces a trade off between the loss of utility due to the
distortion of the contract of type H, and the loss of utility in favor of type L (the information
rent). In a large market where also first best contracts get approximately close to (α, 1), the
cost of distorting is very small, and the Principal will optimally offer a full insurance contract
to type H (βH = 1). This contract leaves both types at their reservation utility, so that the
Incentive Compatibility constraint of type L is binding exactly where his Individual Rationality
constraint binds, and no rents are possible in equilibrium.
Markets often provide an efficient mechanism for resource allocation. Even though infor-
mational asymmetries change this, markets usually provide (weak) Pareto improvements over
the lack of a mechanism. This is not the case here, as access to markets is not universal, and
access to trading opportunities affects other relationships in ways which are detrimental to
some individuals’ welfare. Besides the theoretical point, this result hints at a new direction for
empirical research on securitization and risk sharing across banks.
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5 An Extension: Pool Selection
Suppose now that Principals can employ their technology in R, a project which does not require
an Agent and gives a certain net profit of R . If a Principal is matched with an Agent who
will not accept any of the contracts he is offered, she can invest in R instead. In this case
a Principal is facing two further alternatives besides offering the same menu of contracts as
described in the previous section: she can decide simply to invest in R, or she can decide to
offer a contract that will be accepted only by the low risk type L and invest in R if matched
with a high risk type. In this last case the optimal contract to offer is the first best contract
giving L his reservation utility.
Note that this might be the Principal’s optimal choice even if the expected payoff of R
is lower than the payoff from the second best contract for type H. It is sufficient that this
difference is small enough to be offset by the loss coming from the information distortions
(variables with one star ∗ correspond to first best contracts and those with two ∗∗ correspond
to second best contracts):
pEU (α∗L + β
∗
LXL) + (1− p)EU
(
R
)
> pEU (α∗∗L + β
∗∗
L XL) + (1− p)EU (α∗∗H + β∗∗H XH) (2)
If this is the case, high risk agents H will not be contracted. However, markets change the
picture because diversification will make the risky project operated by agent H more attractive
without affecting preferences for R. In fact, if the payoff from R is smaller than the equilibrium
price of the H project in a large market, a Principal in a large market will want to offer the
screening menu and hire both types.11
R < α+ µ (3)
It is then the case that markets can change the pool of projects undertaken in the economy
Proposition 3. When R satisfies both condition 2 and 3,12 Principals in isolation will only
contract L agents, whereas for a sufficiently large number of units, all agents will be contracted
in equilibrium.
Proof. To prove Proposition 3 we need to show that as markets get larger, H types will be
11α is defined in Section 4.2. −α is the transfer giving an Agent his reservation utility when the contract does not
include any profit sharing (1− β = 0).
12 Given the model’s assumptions the two conditions are never exclusive.
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eventually contracted. We need to show that
∃N : ∀M ≥ N,EU
(
−αH(M) + (1− βH(M))µH − b
M
(1− βH(M))2 σ2H
)
≥ u
By Assumption 3 it has to be that
V (αH) > V
(
R
)
But by continuity there must be an N such that for all M greater than N .
V
(
αH(M) + βH(M)µH − b
M
(βH(M))
2 σ2H |M
)
> V
(
R|M) (4)
As we know from Proposition 2, in large markets the first and second best contracts converge
for both types, and eventually coincide for type L (by Corollary 2. This allows us to conclude
that the following inequality holding for some large enough M , so that the Principal will also
offer a contract accepted by type H agents.
pV
(
α∗∗L (M) + β
∗∗
L (M)µL − b
M
(β∗∗L (M))
2
σ2L|M
)
+ (1− p)V
(
α∗∗H (M) + β
∗∗
H (M)µH − b
M
(β∗∗H (M))
2
σ2H |M
)
>
pV
(
α∗L(M) + β
∗
LµL − b
M
(β∗L(M))
2
σ2L|M
)
+ (1− p)V (R|M)
.
This extension of the model suggests an explanation of the evidence showing that the boom
of securitization contributed to expanding the pool of mortgages to include riskier ones.
Under the same conditions, all results from previous sections apply. Their interpretation is
however slightly different, because the non-market equilibrium does not include the H types,
and does not exhibit. Introducing a large market in this case does not change the welfare of the
L Agents, because here they obtain their reservation utility also in absence of markets, because
Principals do not need to screen them from the H types. Examples can be generated showing
that the welfare of L Agents is first increasing and then decreasing in market size. In smaller
finite markets, H types will be contracted, but will not be fully insured. In these economies
L types obtain an information rent as soon as diversification makes H types desirable, which
17
eventually vanishes, as in Corollary 2.
6 Markets without Diversification
One of the key motives for trading on financial markets is the pooling and diversification of
risk. This is not necessarily the case if risks are highly or perfectly perfectly correlated. It
should not come as a surprise that a certain degree of independence and a certain number of
Units are needed for Principals to be able to diversify away enough risk to act as if they were
less risk averse. What is less expected is that enough positive correlation can generate the
“opposite” effect to that of Lemma 1, as the following example shows.
Considering an economy with two Units, and the following parameters.(
µL, σ
2
L
) (
µH , σ
2
H
)
r u ρ
(3, 0.1) (3, 1) 0.1 0.3 0.9
The equilibrium contracts without markets will be
−αL + (1− βL)X = −1.4068 + 0.5711X
−αH + (1− βH)X = −1.3866 + 0.5693X
Those with markets will be
−αML +
(
1− βML
)
X = −1.4451 + 0.5838X
−αMH +
(
1− βMH
)
X = −1.1569 + 0.4913X
This economy is compatible with the conclusion of Lemma 1, which is a statement about
large and finite economies. One would expect that adding enough units is enough to restore
the expected insurance effect, by bringing about more diversification. However, it need not be
the case. The graph shows in blue (below) 1−βH , and in red (above) 1−βL as functions of N .
The sensitivity to returns and hence the variance of the contract of Agent L actually increases
with the size of markets.
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Why does increasing markets make the variance of contract L higher? The existence of
non diversifiable risk, modeled here as positive correlation ρ between Units returns, creates a
strong incentive to issue securities which get as close as possible to hedging returns when the
economy does bad.
To understand the mechanism at work, it is useful to take the “hedging” idea to the extreme
and think in terms of underlying states. Units’ returns are binary XL ∈ {xL, xL} and XH ∈
{xH , xH}, with µL = µH and σ2L < σ2H , so that xH < xL < xL < xH . Suppose ρ is equal to
one, so that a space S = {s, s} with 2 states is sufficient to represent the economy.
Xt (s) = xt
Xt (s) = xt
Whenever an H unit returns xH all other H units will do the same, and L units will return
xL.
In absence of markets both Principals and Agents have the same risk attitude and the
optimal contracts will strike some balance of risk sharing. Now suppose trading is possible.
When Principals designs CL she knows, that when she is matched with L she will then trade
with some H and some L units, and end up holding a portfolio of these. She also knows, as a
L unit, she has an advantage in providing returns in state s, since xH < xL. Units L can hedge
returns in s and the markets provides them, through pricing, with the incentives to do so, by
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making returns in that state particularly valuable. The cost she bears by giving less returns
to Agent L in s, in the form of a higher variable compensation (1− βL) and a lower transfer
−αL is however not changed by markets. This is because Agents do not access markets, and
hence their risk preferences are unaffected by trading opportunities. The optimal contract will
reflect this and give less return to L in state s and more in state s than it would be the case in
absence of trading opportunities. This translates in more risk in the hands of type L Agents.
The extent of this effect hence depends on the difference between xH < xL and of course
on the level of correlation ρ.
In the language of the previous sections, we can observe that the mechanism described
above transfers risk from type H to type L (on top of the -smaller- transfer caused by distortion
described in Lemma 3), while correlation reduces diversification opportunities to the point of
undoing the insurance effect of Theorem 2. It is worth noting that in this numerical example,
the low risk types are once again worse off in a large market than they are in isolation, but for a
different reason than in Corollary 2 of Section 4.2. Here the cost of distortion is not lowered by
markets as in the case of independent returns, but the first best contracts coefficients βL and
βH are more distant in a large market than in isolated units, requiring less (or no) distortion
to make CH less desirable to type L. This in turn reduces (or nullifies) the need for giving him
an information rent in the optimal screening contracts. In fact, examples can be constructed
in which the first best contracts will coincide with the screening contracts for a finite number
of units N .
7 Generalizing Results
The results from the previous two sections are obtained in the context of large markets and
under more stringent assumptions than necessary, namely:
1. There is no systemic risk as all Units return are independently distributed.
2. Types L and H differ only by the variance of the profits they generate.
Under the assumption of independence (as in Lemma 1) Principals act as if they were less
risk averse as N got large. In general this need not be true, because correlation across Units
generates non diversifiable risk and, as shown in the previous example, a high level of corelation
can change the effects of markets on contracts, undoing some of the results. However we can
conclude that for sufficiently small levels of correlation the insurance effect still holds.
We can also relax the second assumption by allowing for a more general pair of types. In
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fact the results of Section 4 will also apply when pairs are ranked by Second Order Stochastic
Dominance. That is, as long as any expected utility maximizer prefers holding some claim on
type L than some claim on type H:
Assumption 2. L Second Order Stochastically Dominates H if and only if
E (u (α+ βXL)) ≥ E (u (α+ βXH))
∀α ∈ R, β ∈ [0, 1] , u (·)
where u (·) is strictly increasing and concave
This intuitive condition includes the case of different variance already discussed, the case
in which both types generate the same variance of returns, but L provides higher mean returns
µL > µH , and the case in which they generate the same two outcomes, but L has a higher
probability of the best outcome.
We can generalize all results of Section 4.1 and 4.213 to economies where the following
conditions hold:
1. There is an appropriately bounded amount of systemic risk.
2. Types L Second Order Stochastically Dominates H.
The following result is the equivalent of Lemma 1:
Proposition 4. Suppose Assumption 2 holds, then there is a ρ > 0, such that, if ρmnst < ρ for
all m,n, s, t, increasing the number of Units in an economy, eventually induces Principals to
retain more risk at the contracting stage.
∀N,∃N : βnt
(
N ′
) ≥ βnt (N) ,∀n,∀t ∈ {G,B} , ∀N ′ ≥ N
Furthermore, ∃Ns.t.βnH (N) = 1, ∀N ≥ N
Even though the contract of L does not converge to full insurance, all results from Section 4.2
also apply. In particular, the fact that the contract H will give him full insurance (Proposition
4) implies that no Agent will obtain more than their reservation utility (Corollary 2), as was
the case without aggregate risk.
13Note the result on the pool extension from Section 5 may not carry over to the more general assumption on
types because the outside option and type H cannot be ranked according to SSD. They do apply however in the case
most relevant to securitization, that of different default probabilities. Furthermore I conjecture that allowing for a
more complex outside option can replicate the result for any pair of types satsfying SSD.
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8 Conclusions
To analyze how financial markets interacts with contracting in presence of asymmetric infor-
mation which is dealt with outside markets. To do so I construct a model integrating Principal-
Agent interaction with hidden type in an asset markets. A Unit is formed by a Principal and
an Agent. Each pair produces random returns, whose distribution is known only to the agent
at the contracting stage. Unlike in a standard contracting model is that Principals have access
to an asset market on which they trade their shares of returns, and a riskless asset.
I present a general framework and define a notion of equilibrium, for which I prove existence.
With the added structure of a low correlation and an ordering on types, I study the interactions
of financial markets and contracts. The existence of markets, can have an Insurance Effect,
inducing less risky compensation for agents, and having important welfare implications.
Asymmetric information within Units induces excessive aggregate risk in markets. The
amount of extra risk is small when markets are large. But, while large markets increase the
utility of Principals who access them, they will push all Agents to their reservation utility,
including those who enjoyed an information rent when Units operated “in isolation” or in small
markets. Introducing markets in these economies does not result in a Pareto Improvement, and
it is the “better” Agents who will be worse off. This result suggests new testable implications
on the effects of securitization.
Although this is not the focus on the paper, I also show how an extension of the model
accomodates the empirical evidence on the expansion of the mortgage pool caused by the
increase of securitization.
The seemingly natural “insurance effect” need not obtain, and how a high level of non
diversifiable risk, might induce the opposite effect for some types of Agents. For contracts
to exhibit less variance, three ingredients must be present in the economy. A large number
of traders, a limited amount of systemic risk, and types ordered according to Second Order
Stochastic Dominance. As soon as one of these assumptions is dropped, counterexamples can
be constructed. It is a relevant empirical question whether systemic risk can be large enough
to upset the “insurance effect”, and a theoretical question to study the implications besides
the example provided in the paper.
It is worth highlighting two special features of this model to discuss its limitations.
First is the choice of a quadratic utility function, which exhibits Increasing Absolute Risk
Aversion utility. This functional form was chosen mainly for two reasons. It yields a CAPM
equilibrium and makes the screening problem somewhat tractable. Most importantly Increasing
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Risk Aversion stacks the card against the results: Markets allow diversification, but they
also increase the utility level of principals, making them more risk averse. I show that this
countervailing effect is eventually overcome by a large enough market. Using a DARA utility
specification would make the results even stronger.
Secondly, the matching between Principals and Agents is modeled as an exogenous process.
Endogenizing the formation of Principal-Agent pairs seems an interesting venue for future
research, given the welfare effects asset markets have in this model suggests the matching and
financial sides might exhibit interactions.
9 Appendix
In this appendix the reader can look the hood of the model, and see the details of how financial
markets change the Principal’s problem. After having established the necessary notation, I will
prove existence of the model, and finally generalize the Insurance effect of Sections 4 and 6 to
a more general type space.
9.1 Mean-Variance and CAPM
As previously noted, the assumptions on preferences and availability of a riskless asset, pay off
in terms of tractability. Let us first note that quadratic expected utility preferences on random
variables can be equivalently represented as preferences over mean and variance of random
variables.
E [u (X)] =
E [X]− b
2
E
[
X2
]
=
E [X]− b
2
E [X]2 − b
2
V ar [X]
I will call the Mean-Variance representation F
(
µX , σ
2
X
)
, where the first argument is the
mean of X and the second argument its variance.
Linear contracts also allow a handy representation in terms of Mean and Variance.
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µα+βX = α+ βµX
σ2α+βX = β
2σ2X
These assumptions also imply the existence of a CAPM equilibrium in the asset market.14,
so that the final holdings in equilibrium can be expressed analytically.
Every individual will hold the same risky portfolio, an equal fraction 1
N
of the aggregate
endowment, and will spend the rest on the riskless asset (or short it if their remaining endow-
ment is negative). With this in mind the mean and variance of the portfolio held by the agent
is readily computed as a function of contracts. For a general principal n we have that 15
• The holding of riskless asset is qn − 1
N
∑N
m=1 q
m
• The mean of the risky portfolio is 1
N
∑N
m=1 (α
m + βmµm)
• The variance of the risky portfolio is 1
N2
∑N
m=1
(
β2mσ
m2 +
∑
k 6=m ρ
mkβmβkσmσk
)
Since qn = αn + βnµn − b
N
βn2σn2
∑
m 6=n ρ
mnβmβnσmσn, we have that the mean of Pn’s
holdings simplifies to
αn + βnµn − b
N
βn2σn2 + ∑
m 6=n
ρmnβnβmσnσm
+ b
N2
N∑
m=1
βm2σm2 + ∑
k 6=m
ρmkβmβkσmσk

and the variance is of course the variance of the risky part 1
N2
∑N
m=1
(
β2mσ
m2 +
∑
k 6=m ρ
mkβmβkσmσk
)
9.2 The Objective Function
If V (αn, βn) = F
(
αn + βnµn, βn2σn2
)
is the utility a Principal obtains from contract α, β
when no markets are available, markets will change this into
14See the proof of Lemma 4
15 Note that the covariance between two assets is
Cov (Xms , X
n
t ) = ρ
m,n
s,t σ
m
s σ
n
t
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VM (α
n, βn) =
FM
(
αn + βnµn, βn2σn2
)
=
F
αn + βnµn − b
N
βn2σn2 + ∑
m 6=n
ρnmβnβmσnσm
+ b
N2
∑
m∈N
βm2σm2 + ∑
k 6=m
ρmkβmβkσmσk

,
1
N2
∑
m∈N
βm2σm2 + ∑
k 6=m
ρmkβmβkσmσk

It is useful for the following proof to explicitly write the partial derivatives of VM with
respect
∂VM
∂αn
(αn, βn) = Fµ (·, ·)
∂VM
∂βn
(αn, βn) = Fµn (·, ·)
µn − b
N
2σn2βn + ∑
m 6=n
ρnmσnσmβm
+ b
N2
2σn2βn + 2 ∑
m 6=n
ρnmσnσmβm

+Fσ2 (·, ·)
 1
N2
2σn2βn + 2 ∑
m 6=n
ρnmσnσmβm

When principals are allowed to trade their claims, they will act at the first stage, as if their
utility functions were
EtVM (α
n
t β
n
t ) =
EtF
M (αnt + βnt µnt , βn2σn2) =
EtF
αnt + βnt µnt − b
N
βn2t σn2t + ∑
m 6=n
ρnmtt(m)β
n
t β
m
t(m)σ
n
t σ
m
(m)

+
b
N2
∑
m∈N
βm2t(m)σm2t(m) + ∑
k 6=m
ρmkt(k)t(m)β
m
t(m)β
k
t(k)σ
m
t(m)σ
k
t(k)

,
1
N2
∑
m∈N
βm2t(m)σm2t(m) + ∑
k 6=m
ρmkt(m)t(k)β
m
t(m)β
k
t(k)σ
m
t(m)σ
k
t(k)

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9.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. I am going to use a well known fixed point result by Glicksberg (1952) to show that
there is an equilibrium in the first stage of the game, given that the asset market develops as
predicted by the CAPM model.
I need to show that
1. The strategy space of each Principal ∆(Mn) is a convex, compact subset of a locally
convex Hausdorff space.
2. The best response correspondence of all principals is upper hemi-continuous, convex val-
ued, and nonempty.
For the first part note that the space of Incentive Compatible menus Mn is a subset of a
Euclidean space. It is closed because it is defined by a finite number of weak inequalities, and
it is bounded because it is included in the larger set of feasible contracts. To make it compact,
we need to show it is bounded. β is bounded between 0 and 1. α is bounded above by α such
that EU (−α+XL). It is also bounded below by α such that EU (−α) = u. Since it will be
the case that βH ≥ βL and this implies that αH ≤ αL. Since αL has to be larger than α, these
bounds will be satisfied.
The space of lotteries (identified with Borel probability measures) over these Menus is of
course convex. It is also compact with respect to the weak* topology. This space of probabilities
is a subset of the space of continuous functions C (Mn), which is locally convex (and Hausdorff)
with respect to the weak* topology.16
For the second part, convexity of the best response correspondence follows from preferences
on random variables being represented by expected utility. I will use Berge’s Maximum theorem
to show that it is non empty, compact-valued and upper hemi-continuous.
To apply the maximum theorem to individuals’ best response, it has to be that constraints
vary continuously with other principals’ strategies, and that the payoff function is continuous
in one’s own actions.
First note how the constraints correspondence is constant with respect to other principals
strategies, and is therefore continuous. Also note how the constraints correspondence maps to
the space of Borel probability measures on menus, which is a Hausdorff space as noted above.
We also need to make sure that the payoff function of a principal is continuous in menus.
To do this we need to show that
16For a treatment of these and other results on weak topologies, and also to see the theorems of Berge and
Glicksberg, see Aliprantis, Border (2005)
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1. Payoffs at the market stage are a continuous function of the contracts chosen by agents.
2. The contracts chosen by agents are a continuous function of the menus offered.
Claim 1 By Lemma 4, if the preferences are monotonic for (µ,Ω), they are going to be
monotonic for the asset markets resulting from all possible contracts C. Under the present
assumptions a CAPM equilibrium exists once contracts are chosen.17 Because in equilibrium
the price of a security can be expressed as qn = αn+βnµn− b
N
(
βn2σn2 + Σm 6=nρmnβmβnσmσn
)
The indirect utility from a contract profile in the CAPM function is continuous in contracts.
Claim 2 Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to Incentive Compatible menus,
from the set MnIC . If a principal makes a small change to the menu he offers while remaining
in this set, every type of agent t , will still find it optimal to pick the contract intended for
him, Ct. Hence any small change, will correspond to a small change in the contract picked by
each type of agent.
We can conclude that the indirect utility for a principal facing type t is a continuous function
of the menus offered.
Taking expectation with respect to F over these indirect utilities yields a continuous func-
tional on the domain of lotteries on IC menus ∆ (MnIC).
By the maximum theorem the best response correspondence of each player is now UHC and
compact valued, which implies that the game best response is as well.
By Glicksberg’s theorem there is a fixed point, which is an equilibrium by construction.
9.4 The Type Space
Moving to Section 4 we saw that the results from the leading example extend to a more general
setting, in which type can differ by more than the variance of the returns they generate. As
long as the project operated by type L second order stochastically dominates H, all results go
through. This is because Second Order Stochastic Dominance implies the following adapatation
of Single Crossing Property, which is used in the proofs to reduce the set of relevant constraints.
Definition 1. We say Types L snd H satisfy condition R if and only if the following holds: 18
17In the literature briefly reviewed by Nielsen (1990), one can find many sufficient conditions for the existence of a
CAPM equilibrium, most of them deal with the possibility of satiation of preferences. Things are particularly simple
when returns are bounded (which includes this model): monotonicity and local non satiation are guaranteed by a
low enough risk aversion.
18 The condition amounts to Single Crossing Property in the space of the two components of contracts. Restricting
attention to quadratic preferences yields a simpler definition and the same results.
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∂E [u (α+ βXL)]
∂β
>
∂E [u (α+ βXH)]
∂β
,∀α, β (R)
Before discussing the implications of this property, I will prove it is implied by Second Order
Dominance.
Proposition 5. Second Order Stochastic Dominance of XL over XH implies Condition R.
Proof. Saying that XL SSD XH amounts to saying that XL is preferred by any risk averse
decision maker: E [u (XL)] ≥ E [u (XH)] for any concave u .
Since rescaling and shifting preserve convexity/concavity, this implies that E [u (α+ βXL)] ≥
E [u (α+ βXH)] for any concave u, any α and any β between 0 and 1.
In other words if, XL SSD XH implies α+ βXL SSD α+ βXH
To reach the desired conclusion, I will now focus on the economies at hand, which exhibit
quadratic preferences, strictly monotonic on the possible returns from projects.
In this context second order stochastic dominance of α+ βXL over α+ βXH translates to:
α+ βµL − b
2
(α+ βµL)
2 − b
2
σ2L ≥ α+ βµH − b
2
(α+ βµH)
2 − b
2
σ2H
Whereas condition R translates to
µL (1− bα− bβµL)− bβσ2L ≥ µH (1− bα− bβµH)− bβσ2H
First rearrange:
b
{
α (µL − µH) + β
[(
µ2L − µ2H
)
+
(
σ2L − σ2H
)]} ≤ µL − µH
Then divide19 by µL − µH to obtain:
b
{
α+ β
[
µL + µH +
σ2L − σ2H
µL − µH
]}
≤ 1
Note that since SSD implies σ2L ≤ σ2H , this is implied by:
19The difference cannot be negative, because of SSD, and when µL = µH , the claim is trivially satisfied.
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b {α+ β [µL + µH ]} ≤ 1
Since α is bounded above and below, the condition is satisfied by the monotonicity assump-
tion (??) allowing us to conclude that in these economies Second Order Stochastic Dominance
is a sufficient condition “rank” types by Single Crossing Property.
Condition R simply requires that for any given contract (α, β), a marginal change in share
of profit yields more utility to type L than it does for type H.
Fact 1 substantiates the claim that R is a reasonable notion of L being better than H, as
it encompasses a few interesting cases.
9.4.1 Some implications of Single Crossing Property
Fact 1. With quadratic utility the following cases imply SCP :
1. Both types generate the same mean returns but L does so with lower variance. σ2L < σ
2
H
2. Both types generate the same variance of returns, but L provides higher mean returns.
µL > µH
3. Both types can generate the same two outcomes, but L has a higher probability of the best
outcome.
Fact 2. In the case of quadratic utility, SCP amounts to
µL (1− b (−α)− bµL (1− β))− bσ2L (1− β) > µH (1− b (−α)− bµH (1− β))− bσ2H (1− β)
The following two implications of SCP will be useful in the proof Theorem 2
Fact 3. ∀ (α, β) , U (−α, 1− β|G) > U (−α, 1− β|B)
Fact 4. ∀ (α, β) , (α′, β′) : β ≤ β′
U (−α, (1− β)|G)− U (−α′, (1− β′)∣∣G) > U (−α, (1− β)|B)− U (−α′, (1− β′)∣∣B)
Fact 5. SCP implies that µL ≥ µB
Fact 6. SCP implies that σL ≤ σB
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The proof of Fact 1 follows.20
Proof. 1. µL = µH , σ
2
L < σ
2
H . As all identical parts cancel from the condition above, we are
left with −σ2L > −σ2H . Multiplying both sides by −1 concludes the proof of 1.
2. µL > µH , σ
2
L = σ
2
H .
U2, the derivative with respect to (1− β) is given by
µ+ bαµ− b (1− β)µ2 − b (1− β)σ2
we want to show that U2 (·|G) > U2 (·|B), that is
µL + bαµL − b (1− β)µ2L − b (1− β)σ2 > µB + bαµB − b (1− β)µ2B − b (1− β)σ2
µL (1 + bα− b (1− β)µL) > µB (1 + bα− b (1− β)µB)
Since b (1− β) is smaller than 1, the claim is satisfied whenever µL > µH .
3. Without loss of generality suppose that the outcome can be either 0 or 1, and let pL be
the probability of success of an agent of type t with, and consider pL > pH . The returns
from employing agent t , will have mean pL and variance pL (1− pL). Again, let’s start
by proving that U2 (·|G) > U2 (·|B). That is
pL+bαpL−b (1− β) p2L−b (1− β) pL (1− pL) > pB+bαpB−b (1− β) p2B−b (1− β) pH (1− pH)
which readily simplifies to
pL + bαpL − b (1− β) pL > pB + bαpB − b (1− β) pH
and finally (pL − pB) (1 + bα− b (1− β)) > 0.
This has to be true, as pL > pB by assumption and the second term in brackets cannot
be negative, otherwise individual utility x − b
2
x2 would be decreasing for x = 1, which
violates the assumption of monotonicity of preferences.
For the following set of results this condition will be needed
Assumption 3. Condition R is satisfied.
9.5 Insurance
Lemma 4. Under Assumption 3, there is a ρ, such that, if ρ < ρ
• βnL (N) < 1, βnH (N) ≤ 1
• limN→∞ βnt (N) = 1,∀n,∀t
20 The other proofs are a matter of algebra and available upon request
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• ∃Ns.t. βnH (N) = 1, ∀N ≥ N
Proof. A generic Principal is solving the problem
max
(αL,βL),o(αH ,βH )
EtV
M (αt, βt|t)
s.t. U (−αt, 1− βt|t) ≥ u, ∀t ∈ {G,B} (IR t)
U (−αt, 1− βt|t) ≥ U (−αt′ , 1− βt′ |t) , ∀t, t′ ∈ {G,B} (IC t t’)
SCP and IC constraints imply by usual arguments that yield that
(1− β∗L) ≥ (1− β∗H) (5)
Of course this implies that βL ≤ βH
To attain the desired result, we have to solve for the contract of type G. To do this I show
that the ICGB constraint will always be binding, and that this is enough
The first thing to do is to reduce the set of relevant constraints.
Fact 3 implies that
U (−αL, 1− βL|G) ≥ U (−αL, 1− βL|B)
This together with IR holding for type H and IC holding for type L implies that IR holds
for type L .
In other words, Fact 3 together with
U (−αH , 1− βH |B) ≥ u
U (−αL, 1− βL|G) ≥ U (−αH , 1− βH |G)
implies that
U (−αL, 1− βL|G) ≥ u
We can hence solve the problem without worrying about any of the IR constraints except
that of type H .
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We can also infer that ICG,B will be binding at an optimum. Suppose that it were not
binding,
U (−αL, 1− βL|G) > U (−αH , 1− βH |G)
Consider an alternative incentive scheme {α′L, β′L}t∈{G,B} , which gives a smaller fixed
payment less transfer −α′L < αL to type L. Because the IC constrainICG,B is not binding,
we are increasing the maximand while remaining in the admissible set of contracts, which
contradicts the original scheme {αt, βt}t∈{G,B} being an optimum.
This and SCP imply that ICB,G will not be binding.
This means that the only relevant constraint for determining the optimal βL is in the form
U (−αL, 1− βL|G) = U (−αH , 1− βH |G)
I now have to solve a simpler problem
max
(αL,βL),o(αH ,βH )
EtV
M (αt, βt|t)
s.t. U (−αH , 1− βH |B) = u (IR B)
U (−αL, 1− βL|G) = U (−αG, 1− βG|G) (IC G, B)
The only first order conditions involving αL and βL are given by
F (t|t(n) = G)VαL − λLU−αL = 0
F (t|t(n) = G)VβL − λLU(1−βL) = 0
Dividing both sides of each equation by F (t|t(n) = G), and solving for λL
F(t|t(n)=G) (where
λL is the Lagrange Multiplier associated with ICG,B yields
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VαL
U−αL
=
VβL
U(1−βL)
Et|t(n)=G
{
FMµ
(
αL + βLµL, β
2
Lσ
2
L
)}
Fµ
(−αL + (1− βL)µL, (1− βL)2 σ2L) =
Et|t(n)=G
{
(µL − bR (N))FMµ
(
αL + βLµL, β
2
Lσ
2
L
)
+ bS (N)
}
µLFµ
(−αL + (1− βL)µL, (1− βL)2 σ2L)− b (1− βL)σ2L
where
R (N) =
1
N
2σn2βn + ∑
m 6=n
ρnmσnσmβm
− 1
N2
2σn2βn + 2 ∑
m 6=n
ρnmσnσmβm

S (N) =
1
N2
2σn2βn + 2 ∑
m 6=n
ρnmσnσmβm

Note that
lim
N→∞
R (N) = [qβLσL + (1− q)βHσH ]σt
lim
N→∞
S (N) = 0
Solving above for βL we have
βL(N) =
[
2σ2LFσ2F
M
µ − Fµ
(−αL + (1− βL)µL, (1− βL)2 σ2L) bR(N)+
Fµ
(−αL + (1− βL)µL, (1− βL)2 σ2L)FMµ (αL + βLµL, β2Lσ2L) bS(N)] /
2σ2LFσ2F
M
µ
(
αL + βLµL, β
2
Lσ
2
L
)
Since Fσ2 = − b2 , this can be written as
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βL(N) =
[
σ2LF
M
µ − Fµ
(−αL + (1− βL)µL, (1− βL)2 σ2L)R(N)+ (6)
−Fµ
(−αL + (1− βL)µL, (1− βL)2 σ2L)FMµ (αL + βLµL, β2Lσ2L)S(N)] / (7)
σ2LF
M
µ
(
αL + βLµL, β
2
Lσ
2
L
)
(8)
As N gets large, this converges to
1− limN→∞R (N)Fµ
(−αL + (1− βL)µL, (1− βL)2 σ2L)
σ2LF
M
µ (αL + βLµL, β
2
Lσ
2
L)
Letting ρL ≡ maxm,n,s,t, ρmnst , and observing that Fµ is always strictly smaller than one, we
can solve the following inequality to find a bound for ρL.
βNOMKTL < 1−
ρLσL lim
∑
m 6=G
σm
N
Fµ
(−αL + (1− βL)µL, (1− βL)2 σ2L)
σ2LF
M
µ (αL + βLµL, β
2
Lσ
2
L)
Which is satisfied whenever ρL <
1−βNOMKTL
σL lim
∑
m6=G
σm
N
= ρL. Whenever all correlations are
bounded above, we have the desired result for type G.
To conclude that every contract is less risky, I need to rule out the case in which βMH goes
from 1 to some value in
(
βML , 1
)
, and then converges to 1, without hitting 1 in a finite time).
Consider the simplified optimization problem with markets described above. Consider the
contract of type H. Let λL be the Lagrange multiplier of the Incentive Compatibility constraint
of type L, ICG,B (type L prefers the contract designed for him over that designed for type H).
The first order conditions determining the contract of type H are
Et|t(n)=B
{
f (H)FMµ
(
αH + βHµH , β
2
Hσ
2
H
)}
+
−λHFµ
(−αH + (1− βH)µH , (1− βH)2 σ2H)+
+λGFµ
(−αH + (1− βH)µL, (1− βH)2 σ2G) = 0
Et|t(n)=B
{
f (H)
[
(µH −R (N))FMµ
(
αH + βHµH , β
2
Hσ
2
H
)
+ S (N)FMσ2
]}
−λH
[
µHFµ
(−αH + (1− βH)µH , (1− βH)2 σ2H)− b (1− βH)σ2H]
+λG
[
µGFµ
(−αH + (1− βH)µL, (1− βH)2 σ2G)− b (1− βH)σ2G] = 0
34
Solving for λH we obtain
Et|t(n)=B
{
f (H)FMµ
(
αH + βHµH , β
2
Hσ
2
H
)}
+λGFµ
(−αH + (1− βH)µL, (1− βH)2 σ2G) /
Fµ
(−αH + (1− βH)µH , (1− βH)2 σ2H) =
Et|t(n)=B
{
f (H)
[
(µH − bR (N))FMµ
(
αH + βHµH , β
2
Hσ
2
H
)
+ S (N)FMσ2
]}
+λG
[
µGFµ
(−αH + (1− βH)µL, (1− βH)2 σ2G)− b (1− βH)σ2G] /
µHFµ
(−αH + (1− βH)µH , (1− βH)2 σ2H)− b (1− βH)σ2H
which we can rewrite as
βH =
1+[
λGFµ
(−αH + (1− βH)µH , (1− βH)2 σ2H)Fµ (−αH + (1− βH)µG, (1− βH)2 σ2G) (µG − µH)−
Fµ
(−αH + (1− βH)µH , (1− βH)2 σ2H)Et|t(n)=B {f (H) bR (N)FMµ M (αH + βHµH , β2Hσ2H)µH + f (H)S (N)FMσ2}] / (DEN)
where
DEN ≡
b
[
Et|t(n)=B
{
(1− q)FMµ
(
αH + βHµH , β
2
Hσ
2
H
)
σ2H
}
+
λG
(
Fµ
(−αH + (1− βH)µL, (1− βH)2 σ2G)σ2H − Fµ (−αH + (1− βH)µH , (1− βH)2 σ2H)σ2G)] ≥ 0
By Fact 5 The first addend in the numerator is positive. Since FMσ2 is negative, the second
addend is also positive, butit will go to zero in a large enough market, and βH will converge to
1 +
[
λGFµ
(−αH + (1− βH)µH , (1− βH)2 σ2H)Fµ (−αH + (1− βH)µG, (1− βH)2 σ2G) (µG − µH)
(9)
−Et|t(n)=B
{
f (H)µHR (N)Fµ
(−αH + (1− βH)µH , (1− βH)2 σ2H)FMµ (αH + βHµH , β2Hσ2H)}] /DEN
By putting an appropriate bound on correlation ρnmst we can constrain limN→∞R(N), to the
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point in which this solution is greater than 1, which cannot be. It has to be that βH (N) = 1.
Hence, there is a N such that βH (N) is equal to 1, ∀N ≥ N and type H will receive a
contract with zero variance. If correlation is bounded above by this value (let it be called ρ)
all conclusions hold. This concludes the proof.
The other results follow from the construction of the optimal contracts in the previous
proof.
9.6 Risk and Welfare
First we need to establish a few facts about the symmetric information economy. The symmetric
information equilibrium menus in the more general economy are
Mˆn (N) =
[
Cˆnt (N)
]T
t=1
=
[(
αˆt (N) , βˆt (N)
)]T
t=1
Lemma 5. Under Assumption 3, there is a ρ, such that, if ρmnst < ρ for all m,n, s, t
• βˆnt (N) < 1
• limN→∞ βˆnt (N) = 1,∀n,∀t
As noted the screening problem distorts the allocations of Units with type H Agents. Before
drawing any conclusions I need to describe how this effect impacts the design of L contracts
through the market portfolio, which each Principal holds in Equilibrium.
9.6.1 Best Response
The following technical Lemma is needed to prove results on aggregate risk. I need to verify
that the overall effect of riskier “type H” securities is not offset by the adjustments made in
response (which will go in the direction of less risky securities).
First I need to establish a few derivatives
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Fact 7.
FMµ = 1− b
(αi + βiµ)− b
N
β2i σ2i + ∑
m 6=i
ρβiβmσiσm
+ b
N2
N∑
m=1
β2mσ2m + ∑
n 6=m
ρβmβnσmσn

∂FMµ
∂βj
= b2
1
N
ρβiσjσi − b
2
N2
βjσ2j +∑
k 6=j
ρβkσjσk

∂R(N)
∂βj
=
1
N
ρσiσj − 1
N2
2ρσiσj
∂S(N)
∂βj
=
1
N2
2ρσiσj
Lemma 6. 1. There is a bound ρ such that if all ρijst < ρ, ∀i, j, s, t then
∣∣∣ ∂βi∂βj ∣∣∣ < 1N
2.
∀i, j, ∂βi
∂βj
< 0
Proof. 1. I am going to use Equation 6 to put a bound on
∣∣∣ ∂βi∂βj ∣∣∣ . Note that Equation 6 is
still an implicit function as βi appears on the right hand side too, so that differentiating
both sides we obtain
∂βi
∂βj
=
dβi
dβj
+
dβi
dβi
∂βi
∂βj
However, rearranging shows that
∂βi
∂βj
=
dβi
dβj
1− dβi
dβi
Because dβi
dβi
can only be negative, it is then sufficient to put a bound on dβi
dβj
to prove the
desired result.
note we can rewrite 6 as
βL = 1− FµE
[
R(N) + FMµ S(N)
]
σ2LE
(
FMµ
) = 1− Fµ
σ2L
[
E (R(N))
E
(
FMµ
) − E [FMµ S(N)]
E
(
FMµ
) ]
Let D1 =
E(R(N))
E(FMµ )
and D2 =
E[FMµ S(N)]
E(FMµ )
.
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We have that
dβi
dβj
= −Fµ
σ2L
[
dD1
dβj
− dD2
dβj
]
and
dD1
dβj
=
E
(
∂R(N)
∂βj
)
E
(
FMµ
)− E (R(N))E (FMµβj)[
E
(
FMµ
)]2
dD2
dβj
=
E
[
FMµβjS(N) + F
M
µ
∂S(N)
∂βj
]
E
(
FMµ
)− E (FMµ )E (S(N))E (FMµβj)[
E
(
FMµ
)]2
Since the derivatives in Fact 7 all go to zero when N gets large, it must be the case that∣∣∣ dβidβj ∣∣∣ also goes to zero, which in turn implies the same for ∣∣∣ ∂βi∂βj ∣∣∣.
In the case in which all ρ’s are equal to zero, the claim follows trivially satisfied since dD2
dβj
is equal to zero, and dD1
dβj
is of the order of 1
N2
In the case in which ρ’s are greater than zero, I will need to put an upper bound to make
sure that correlation does not affect the utility function in similar fashion to Section 6.
All of the addends in dD2
dβj
are of the order of 1
N2
, so that we can focus on D1. Since
both addends in dD1
dβj
are continuous, increasing (in absolute value) in ρ, and of order 1
N2
,
when ρ is equal to zero, we can conclude that there is a bound ρ below which dD1
dβj
will
be smaller than 1
N
. This bound is given by the minimum between 1 and
E[FMµ (α,1)]
Fµ(−α,0)
2. We have left to show that the sign of the derivative is negative. Since the derivative of
D2 is of the order of 1
N2
we only need to focus on 1, and show its derivative is positive.
The first addend always is, the second depends on the sign of FMµβj . Inspection shows
that when N is large enough, this depends on the difference between σL and σH . Since
SCP implies σL < σH we can conclude that F
M
µβj
is smaller than zero, and so is ∂βi
∂βj
.
9.6.2 Risk Transfer
Theorem 4. For a large enough N private information implies
1. Higher insurance for bad types. (higher βH than at first best)
2. Lower insurance for good agents (lower βL)
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3. More aggregate risk on markets (higher variance of the market portfolio) (higher E
(∑N
i=1 βiσi
)
).
Proof. The strategy of the proof is straightforward. All types H get full insurance (which is a
distortion) after some finite N . This puts extra risk on the market. Principals take this into
account when designing contracts. Corollary 2, H contracts are going to offer full insurance,
even with changes in L contracts. The distortion will be compensated by the design of L
contracts, which will put less risk on the market and more on the good agents.
1. We know from Corollary 2 that there is a finite N such that βL is equal to 1, which is
higher than what it would be at first best.
2. I now have to show the effects of distortion on other contracts. I will use for this the
results from Lemma 6. The idea is that the change in H contracts generates a smaller change
in L contracts. 21 In general I will need to show that
∣∣∣∑βi (β′−i)− βi (β−i)∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∑β′i − βi∣∣∣
and that the sequence of best responses starting from the first best contracts and con-
verging to the second best contracts, generates a converging series such that the initial vari-
ation (1− q) (1− β∗H)N is only partially compensated by a smaller variation of opposite sign
q (βL − β∗L)N , so that the total aggregate risk varies by a positive quantity (1− q) (1− β∗H)σH−
q (β∗L − βL)σL, .
To show this we will exploit the structure of the economy. The symmetry of Principals,
implies that there are only two optimal contracts CL and CH . Since we know that in a large
market under asymmetric information βH is equal to 1 regardless of the value of other contracts,
we only need to worry about how the initial “informational shock” reverberates through βL .
Let sH = (1− β∗H), the informational shock type L contracts, and SH = (1− q)N (1− β∗H),
the aggregate informational shock. Let β0L be the “share” part of the equilibrium contract
for type H under symmetric information. Let Ck+1L =
(
αk+1L , β
k+1
L
)
be the variable part of
the optimal H contract for a principal when other Principals are offering CH = (α, 1) and
CL =
(
αkL, β
k
L
)
.
Let s0 = β
1
L−β0L and sk+1 = βk+1L −βkL, with their aggregate equivalents S0 = qN
(
β1L − β0L
)
21 This is akin to the best response correspondence being a contraction, which suggests the possibility of a con-
structive proof of existence and uniqueness whenever the assumption of large numbers, correlation, and type ranking
are satisfied.
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and Sk = qN
(
βk+1L − βkL
)
We can compute each step using the derivatives from Lemma 6 and the mean value theorem
(βiI are the intermediate points given by the mean value theorem).
s0 ≈ (1− q)N ∂βi
∂βj
(
β0I
)
sH
s1 ≈ qN ∂βi
∂βj
(
β1I
)
s0
sk ≈ qN ∂βi
∂βj
(
βkI
)
sk−1 =
qkNk
k∏
m=1
∂βi
∂βj
(βmI ) s0
qk (1− q)Nk
k∏
m=0
∂βi
∂βj
(βmI ) sH
Visual inspection shows that sk goes to zero as k gets larger. This means that, if the sum
of these terms converges, the corresponding contracts C = limCk , are the type H equilibrium
contracts with asymmetric information.
To see that the sum converges note that
∞∑
k=0
sk =
∞∑
k=0
s2k + s2k+1 = (10)
∞∑
k=0
s2k
(
1 + qN
∂βi
∂βj
(
β2k+1I
))
= (11)
(1− q) sH
∞∑
k=0
(
1 + qN
∂βi
∂βj
(
β2k+1I
))
q2k
[
2k∏
m=0
N
∂βi
∂βj
(βmI )
]
(12)
Each term of the above sum is negative (because of the product term multiplying 2k + 1
negative numbers) and bounded above by q2k. This means that the sum converges to some
negative number sL .
3. ( |SL| < |SH |). I need to show that q |sL| < (1− q) |sH | . By Lemma 6 |s0| < (1− q) |sH |
which implies that q |s0| < (1− q) |sH |. Showing that |sL| < |s0| will conclude the proof. Since
both sides of the inequality are negative, this amounts to
sL > s0
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Recalling how sL is derived we can subtract s0 on both sides and to obtain
∞∑
k=1
sk > 0
The sum can be written as
∞∑
k=1
sk =
∞∑
k=0
s2k+1 + s2k+2 =
∞∑
k=1
s2k+1
(
1 + qN
∂βi
∂βj
(
β2k+2I
))
> 0
s2k+1 is positive for all k and the term in parentheses is positive by Lemma6, which mean
the sum is positive (convergence follows from part 2.)
9.6.3 Results
Theorem 4 immediately implies all the results, as stated in the main text of the paper.
Theorem 5. Increasing the number of Units in an economy, eventually induces Principals to
retain more risk at the contracting stage.
∀N,∃N : βˆnt
(
N ′
) ≥ βˆnt (N) ,∀n,∀t ∈ {G,B} , ∀N ′ ≥ N
Proposition 6. In a large market, Aggregate Risk is higher than under symmetric information.
E
(
N∑
1=1
(
βnt(n)
)2
σ2t(n)
)
≥ E
(
N∑
1=1
(
βˆnt(n)
)2
σ2t(n)
)
,
Proposition 7. Increasing the number of Units in an economy, eventually makes contracts
closer to the symmetric information ones. Letting ∆nt (N) = |βnt (N)− βˆnt (N)|.
∀n,∀N, ∃N : ∀N ′ ≥ N,∆nt
(
N ′
)
< ∆nt (N)
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that contracts are arbitrarily close to 1 for large enough
markets, regardless of the information structure and Theorem 4.
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Corollary 2. With large enough markets, no agent enjoys an information rent.
∃N : ∀N ≥ N,U (Ct (N) , t) = u,∀t
Proof. For a given economy consider an N ′ which makes βnH(N) = 1, in every Unit, as per
Equation 9. The contract will be in the form CnH = (α, 1) where α is such that −α− b2 (−α)2 = u
. This contract leaves both types at their participation constraint. This implies that the optimal
contract for type L will also give him only his reservation utility, because that is the most he
can obtain by mimicking type H.
9.7 Counterexamples
These two examples, combined with the correlation example in Section 6 show that the as-
sumptions (independence of returns and ordering of types), and conclusions of Lemma 1 are
“tight”.
To conclude the proof we have to show that.
9.7.1 A Type Space violating SCP
Consider the following set of parameters(
µL, σ
2
L
) (
µH , σ
2
H
)
b u
(2.1, 1) (2, 0.1) 0.1 0.3
−αL + (1− βL)X = −0.9301 + 0.6163X
−αH + (1− βH)X = 0.3122
Those with markets will be
−αML +
(
1− βML
)
X = 0.3083 + 0.0018X
−αMH +
(
1− βMH
)
X = −0.9301 + 0.4913X
We can see that the contract of type H becomes riskier as markets are introduced. This is
because in this example SCP fails, so that there is not a “better” type. In this example, which
type is “better” now depends on the diversification possibilities available to Principals.
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9.7.2 Small Market
The insurance results are formulated as convergence results rather than Comparative Statics
result. The following example shows that a stronger comparative statics would not be true.
Adding a Unit does not necessarily induce insurance for Agents.
Consider the set of parameters.(
µL, σ
2
L
) (
µH , σ
2
H
)
r u
(3, 0.3) (2, 1) .01 .5
The equilibrium contracts without markets will be
−αL + (1− βL)X = −0.2483 + 0.2499X
−αH + (1− βH)X = −0.5368 + 0.5197X
Those with markets will be
−αML +
(
1− βML
)
X = −0.7713 + 0.4243X
−αMH +
(
1− βMH
)
X = −0.3529 + 0.4275X
In this economy, the contract of type H is now riskier, when markets are present.
To have an intuition for what is going on, compare the parameters with those from the
previous example and note that now
• Risk Aversion is very low. Markets do not change much the risk taking attitude, as
Principals are close to being risk neutral.
• The distributions of returns are very different. Entering the market amounts to selling
half of a Unit to buy a fraction of the other, plus/minus a transfer of riskless asset. This
introduce a big change in the risk held by a principal.
In this example, the Principal owning the safer Unit ends up holding more risk than her
agent does, when the possibility of trading is introduced. She is of course compensated with
a transfer of riskless asset, but at the contracting stage she acts as if her risk attitude has
increased
Consider what happens to the contracts when markets are present. If we consider a replica
economy with 10 Units, we will have that
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−αML +
(
1− βML
)
X = 0.0279 + 0.1578X
−αMH +
(
1− βMH
)
X = 0.1835 + 0.1589X
Lemma 1 starts biting and both contracts are again less risky than they would have been
without markets. This is because the large number of Units makes diversification and the
ensuing change in risk aversion enough to countervail the effect of selling part of the less risky
endowment.
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